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 The End
 of Secrecy
 by Ann Florini
 rT wo standards of behavior are slugging it out around the world. Advocates of well-
 established norms such as corporate pri-
 vacy and national sovereignty want to hide
 information from prying eyes, while promoters of transparency tout it as
 the solution to everything from international financial crises to arms
 races and street crime.
 Just what is transparency? Put simply, transparency is the opposite
 of secrecy. Secrecy means deliberately hiding your actions; trans-
 parency means deliberately revealing them. This element of volition
 makes the growing acceptance of transparency much more than a
 resigned surrender to the technologically facilitated intrusiveness of
 the Information Age. Transparency is a choice, encouraged by
 changing attitudes about what constitutes appropriate behavior.
 Transparency and secrecy are not either/or conditions. As ideals, they
 represent two ends of a continuum. What we are seeing now is a rapid-
 ly evolving shift of consensus among observers and actors worldwide
 about where states and corporations should be on that continuum. For
 corporations, the point of balance is moving away from an emphasis on
 privacy to agreement on financial transparency and corporate social
 responsibility. For nation-states, the shift is occurring between old ideas
 of sovereignty, which allowed states to keep the world out of their
 domestic matters, and a new standard that they must explain their
 actions to the world. Although usually considered separately, trans-
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 parency's many applications are intrinsically linked. All reflect the grow-
 ing necessity and utility of regulation by revelation, a dynamic new alter-
 native to the coercive power of states.
 Yet precisely because transparency represents such a profound
 change-both in the distribution of power and the way in which it is
 exercised-its spread has provoked resistance from some quarters. To
 governments or corporations that are just doing what they have always
 done, the expectation that they should now report on their activities
 to outsiders can seem like an affront or an inconvenience, if not an
 outright threat. Government bureaucrats struggle to keep up with the
 endless reporting requirements of international environmental, human
 rights, and financial institutions. Corporations find themselves
 besieged by demands for information on their environmental and labor
 practices, often from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) based in
 other parts of the world. International organizations such as the World
 Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) face growing pres-
 sure to open up their decision-making processes to public review. All
 find the bright light of scrutiny at best uncomfortable, at worst para-
 lyzing. Many states, corporations, and organizations have instead
 retreated behind more traditional norms of privacy or sovereignty,
 insisting that although calls for transparency are all well and good, they
 should not be required to hew to its demands.
 Who is right? What information should be made available, when,
 and to whom? To answer these questions we need to look at how trans-
 parency began to catch on, how it works in practice, and why it is nec-
 essary to have a norm of transparency even today, when technology is
 rendering snooping ever more effective.
 WHAT DRIVES TRANSPARENCY?
 After World War I, the Allies required Germany to demilitarize, insti-
 tuting verification procedures that included international inspection
 commissions. Yet once these transparency measures were established,
 it quickly became clear that, other than France, the victorious powers
 had little stomach for enforcing the more intrusive provisions. Amer-
 ican and British officials believed they had no right to inspect the ter-
 ritory of a sovereign nation against its wishes and feared that such
 intrusion would be more likely to provoke friction and hostility than
 to bolster the cause of peace.
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 Smile, you're on candid camera.
 Eighty years later, America and
 Britain were prepared to go to war
 to enforce similar inspection pro-
 visions against Iraq. Although
 much of the world opposed the use
 of force, no one argued that there
 was anything inherently illegiti-
 mate about inspections. Chinese,
 French, and Russian leaders all
 joined the United States in
 demanding that Iraq allow UN
 inspectors to go forward, arguing
 that it was obliged to comply with
 Security Council resolutions.
 In both cases, a defeated state
 was forced to accept foreign inspec-
 tion of its military capabilities. In
 the 1920s, the prevailing attitude
 held that states, even aggressors,
 had a right to military privacy.
 Then-U.S. secretary of state Frank
 Kellogg stated unambiguously that
 "the United States will not tolerate the supervision of any outside body in
 [disarmament] nor be subjected to inspection or supervision by foreign
 agencies or individuals." By the 1990s, complete disclosure had become so
 legitimate that the right to coerce such disclosures from an aggressor-sov-
 ereign state or not-was broadly taken for granted by the international
 community. Obviously, something has changed in the interim.
 Admittedly, dramatic advances in technology have made trans-
 parency more possible and more attractive (see box on page 55). But no
 matter how small or farseeing surveillance devices become, secrets will
 remain plentiful, protected by technological forces that can obscure as
 easily as they can unveil.
 Instead, transparency is spreading as part and parcel of two other
 trends: democratization and globalization. With the spread of democra-
 tic norms, it seems right that powerful entities such as states and corpo-
 rations should be held accountable for their behavior. A fundamental
 norm of democracy is, after all, the consent of the governed, and con-
 sent is meaningless unless it is informed.
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 Now, consent must come from a much wider group: As the world
 shrinks, a lot of people want to have a say in what used to be other
 people's business. As trade, information flows, environmental prob-
 lems, and all sorts of direct contacts between individuals continue to
 cut across existing political boundaries, what people do in one locale
 affects more and more people in other places. These ever tightening
 connections create strong pressures for better ways to govern this grow-
 ing number of transnational interactions. New standards about every-
 thing from human rights to nonaggression and environmental
 protection are emerging in response. Increasingly, in issues ranging
 from security to commerce to economics, transparency is the preferred
 means of enforcement. In short, the world is embracing new standards
 of conduct, enforced not by surveillance and coercion but by willful
 disclosure: regulation by revelation.
 Security
 Transparency in the form of verification provisions has been employed
 in arms control for decades, although initially only a handful of coun-
 tries were involved. By the time the Cold War ended, the Eastern and
 Western blocs took for granted the need to open up their territories to
 highly intrusive inspections by the other side. Since then, however,
 transparency has spread far beyond the erstwhile superpowers and their
 allies. More and more multilateral arms control arrangements use trans-
 parency to ensure compliance. And the idea that potential combatants
 should share detailed information about their military capabilities and
 plans with one another has become widely accepted.
 In the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the international commu-
 nity has relied for decades on the inspection programs of the Interna-
 tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor civilian nuclear
 facilities. Shocked by the extent of Iraq's nuclear-weapons program,
 revealed in the wake of the Gulf War, the IAEA's member countries
 recently agreed to make its inspections far more rigorous. Under the
 Model Additional Protocol, which was approved in May 1997, mem-
 bers will provide IAEA inspectors with greater access to information
 about their nuclear programs, including decommissioned facilities,
 research programs, and more thorough design information. The IAEA
 will be allowed to inspect more locations, not only nuclear sites but
 also research and manufacturing facilities that could potentially con-
 tribute to a nuclear program. It will also make more use of environ-
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 mental sampling (looking for the minuscule but distinct traces of
 nuclear material that migrate beyond the immediate environment
 where they are handled) and remote monitoring.
 As arms control spreads to more types of weapons, many of which can
 be made from goods that have legitimate civilian uses, whole industries
 face new transparency requirements. The Chemical Weapons Conven-
 tion (cwc) bans the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling,
 retention, direct or indirect transfer, and use of chemical weapons.
 Entered into force last year, the cwc now claims most of the world's
 countries as signatories and features the most extensive verification pro-
 visions ever attempted. All signatories must declare their chemical-
 weapons holdings. This requirement has already produced one major
 surprise: India's admission of a previously undisclosed weapons program.
 In addition, parties have to report all "precursor" chemicals-com-
 pounds that could be used to make chemical weapons-stored within
 their borders. Many of these compounds are widely used in industry.
 Nevertheless, states must declare them, even if they are in the hands of
 private businesses. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
 Weapons, made up of the countries that are party to the cwc, includes
 a permanent inspectorate empowered to carry out regular inspections of
 private and governmental chemical facilities, as well as short-notice
 "challenge" inspections anywhere on a signatory's territory-an unprece-
 dented derogation of national sovereignty.
 Even when countries fail to agree to bans or limits on weaponry,
 transparency measures help fill in the blanks. In the UN Register of
 Conventional Arms, all UN member states are asked to provide infor-
 mation on their armament imports and exports, including everything
 from battle tanks to missiles and warships. In sharp contrast to the
 nuclear- and chemical-weapons regimes, where only governments
 have access to the information gleaned from verification, the register
 is a public document. And although participation in the register is
 completely voluntary, about 90 countries do so every year, including
 most major importers and exporters. Much of the information it con-
 tains has already been ferreted out by NGOs, such as the Internation-
 al Institute for Strategic Studies in London and the Stockholm
 International Peace Research Institute. Nevertheless, the register has
 revealed some surprises, notably a Russian shipment of missile equip-
 ment to Iran in 1994.
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 The Entomopter Cometh
 In April 1986, Moscow remained tight-lipped about a rumored leak at
 its Chernobyl nuclear facility, but a U.S. government "Keyhole" satel-
 lite captured an unobstructed view of the exploded power plant. Only
 24 hours after Pentagon analysts first saw the wreckage, ABC News
 broadcast the same view from a private satellite. The pictures were blur-
 ry, but the underlying message was clear: So much for the government
 monopoly on high-tech surveillance technology.
 Since then, private aerospace ventures have further narrowed the tech-
 nology gap. Privately owned satellites scheduled for launch this year can
 resolve images to one meter, rivaling the best technology of the world's
 intelligence services. Once these commercial systems are on line, detailed
 images of any spot on the planet will be available on the open market.
 On the ground, ever cheaper surveillance cameras are catching on as a
 means of law enforcement, most often for traffic control. The British, how-
 ever, have been more ambitious. Today, more than 300,000 video cameras
 scan intersections across the United Kingdom for street crime and terror-
 ist activity. Although some civil libertarians find the cameras Orwellian,
 the reality of safer streets has won over much of the population.
 All these systems rely on clunky hardware mounted in plain sight-but
 this too may change. Researchers at MIT are developing a camera that
 weighs less than one-tenth of an ounce and transmits high-definition tele-
 vision-quality images. And a 1992 RAND study on unmanned surveillance
 aircraft has spawned at least a dozen competing designs for "micro air vehi-
 cles" (MAVs) with both military and civilian applications. Also known as
 "airplanes-on-a-chip," these MAVs are intended to weigh two to four
 ounces and to be no bigger than six inches across. One of the most unusu-
 al designs on the drawing board is a four-inch-long, insect-like craft dubbed
 "the entomopter," equipped with legs for crawling through buildings or
 ventilation ducts, and flapping wings for airborne reconnaissance.
 Nevertheless, no matter how small, efficient, or cost-effective surveil-
 lance hardware becomes, there will always be limits to what technology
 can accomplish. Indeed, it is a double-edged sword-witness the polemics
 in Washington and on the Web over who, if anyone, should regulate elec-
 tronic encryption. From untappable communications to pixel-by-pixel
 photo and video editing, technology is often as good at hiding secrets as it
 is at revealing them. Without a norm of transparency, technology will con-
 tinue to protect private information as well as ferret it out.
 SUMMER 1998 55
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 19 Oct 2017 02:12:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The End of Secrecy
 Politics
 Despite the close connection between transparency and democracy, the
 spread of transparency in politics reflects more than just the spread of
 democracy. Democracy-in the sense of regular elections-and high
 levels of transparency do not necessarily go together. Until this year,
 Great Britain, the world's oldest democracy, was more opaque than
 many governments with flimsier liberal credentials. Its Official Secrets
 Act, passed in 1911 during a German spy scare and beefed up in its 1989
 revision, drastically curtailed public access to information about its gov-
 emrnment. Then-prime minister Margaret Thatcher defended the act on
 the grounds that, "We do sometimes have to sacrifice a little of the free-
 dom we cherish in order to defend ourselves from those whose aim is to
 destroy that freedom altogether."
 But even in England, times change. In the last elections, the Labour
 Party campaigned on a promise to make government more open and
 accountable to the citizenry. So far, it seems to be keeping that promise.
 The government of Tony Blair proposed a freedom of information act last
 December, intended to make the United Kingdom one of the most trans-
 parent societies in the world.
 Other countries are joining Britain in its attempt to open up govern-
 ment. A bill is currently circulating in the U.S. Congress that would forbid
 officials to classify documents anonymously. It would also automatically
 declassify most documents after 10 years, instead of the 50-year period com-
 mon today. Even Japan is awash with transparency proposals aimed at its
 bureaucracy. A bill pending in the Diet would compel government min-
 istries and agencies to reveal information to the public upon request.
 Economics
 The collapse of the Soviet Union left free market ideology standing
 unchallenged. Nearly all countries pay at least lip service to the superi-
 ority of markets over states as efficient allocators of resources. But free
 markets have a voracious appetite for timely information. Given the
 choice, investors put their money where transparency allows some pre-
 dictability about the likelihood of returns. Thanks to globalization, they
 have a lot of options, creating a powerful economic incentive for ever
 higher degrees of self-disclosure.
 Nearly unanimous international opinion now holds that the only
 way to restore investor confidence in Asia is to impose transparency.
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 Leading the charge are the U.S. Treasury Department and the IMF,
 which now includes promotion of "greater transparency and account-
 ability in government and corporate affairs" in its mandate. As IMF
 managing director Michel Camdessus has explained, these are now
 economic issues, not solely political ones:
 As more and more evidence has come to light about the adverse conse-
 quences of governance problems on economic performance-among them,
 losses in government revenue, lower quality public investment and public
 services, reduced private investment, and the loss of public confidence in
 government-a broader consensus has emerged on the central importance of
 transparency and good governance in achieving economic success.
 Most officials in Asia seem to have accepted the virtues of transparen-
 cy, at least in the economic field. Singaporean senior minister Lee Kuan
 Yew, stressing the importance of transparency in a country's financial sys-
 tem, recently told Vietnamese prime minister Phan Van Khai: "In an age
 of information technology, instant communications and computers, if you
 try to hide, you are in trouble." Even the Association of South East Asian
 Nations, a group of states that long treated the principle of noninterfer-
 ence as holy writ, announced in December 1997 that it will begin moni-
 toring its members' domestic economies.
 Some in the private sector seem to agree that transparency is in their
 self-interest. Increasingly, foreign companies are listing their stock on
 U.S. exchanges because American accounting standards, which demand
 transparency, provide a seal of approval for investors. When officials
 from Nippon Telegraph and Telephone announced that the company
 would list on the New York and London exchanges, they echoed this
 point: "By listing in the United States, where disclosure rules are stricter
 than in Japan, we hope to win trust from investors."
 Environment
 The environmental field is awash with examples of regulation by rev-
 elation, in which governments require transparency rather than
 enforced standards for pollution. Particularly innovative are trans-
 parency-based efforts to deal with toxic chemicals. More than 50,000
 different chemicals are in regular use by industries around the world,
 most introduced since World War II and very few tested for their
 effects on human health or the environment. In 1986, the U.S. Con-
 gress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
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 Bringing Corruption to Light...
 The problem of corruption is tailor-made for regulation by revelation.
 For many-but not all-public servants, it is embarrassing to be caught
 taking bribes, a sign not only of venality but also of backwardness. And
 corruption is hot news-big, juicy scandals get front-page treatment.
 Transparency International (TI), the NGO community's leading corrup-
 tion fighter, makes brilliant use of the social unacceptability and media
 value of corruption. It publishes the annual Corruption Perceptions Index,
 which ranks countries on how corrupt they are perceived to be accord-
 ing to surveys of business people, political analysts, and the public.
 Although TI also lobbies governments for anticorruption laws and
 treaties, and pressures international financial institutions to include cor-
 ruption concerns in loan conditions and country strategies, the index is
 what gave corruption, and TI, greater international prominence. Now,
 the group is planning to supplement the demand-side index with a sup-
 ply-side bribery index that will publicize which countries are home to
 international corporations with high incidences of graft.
 Act, requiring companies to disclose the quantities of a few hundred
 toxic chemicals commonly released into the air, the water, and onto
 land. The information is sent to the U.S. Environmental Protection
 Agency (EPA), which compiles the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and
 makes it available to the public. Although the act puts no limits on
 emissions, merely requiring their disclosure, its impact has been dra-
 matic: Emissions of the indexed chemicals at facilities covered by TRI
 fell 44 percent between 1988 and 1994, even though production of
 those chemicals rose 18 percent.
 The TRI is more than just an American story. The 1992 UN Confer-
 ence on Environment and Development's final report called for an
 international effort to guide countries interested in developing their
 own inventories. Since then, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
 tion and Development, in collaboration with various UN agencies,
 NGOs, and private businesses, has published a guidance manual for gov-
 ernments and conducted a series of international workshops to do just
 that. Several countries have established, or are in the process of estab-
 lishing, inventory systems, including Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the
 Netherlands. The North American Commission for Environmental
 58 FOREIGN POLICY
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 19 Oct 2017 02:12:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 Florini
 Cooperation, established under the North American Free Trade Agree-
 ment, is working to develop a regional inventory. And the European
 Union (EU) has decided to publish an inventory of principal emissions
 and their sources every three years.
 Other countries have taken a different approach to using trans-
 parency for environmental control. Every year, Indonesia's Environ-
 mental Impact Management Agency publicly grades participating
 facilities by color: Gold means the facility could pollute but does not;
 green means it does better than regulations require; blue means that it
 is following the existing regulations; red means that it is not yet follow-
 ing them; and black means it is seriously violating environmental regu-
 lations and causing substantial harm to the environment. According to
 a World Bank evaluation, the program is significantly increasing com-
 pliance with environmental regulations, important in a country where
 government enforcement is virtually nonexistent. Its success, due to the
 pressure of both local public opinion and the business community's
 desire to market to environmentally sensitive foreign consumers, has
 ... and Making Pollution Public
 The Toxic Release Inventory (TmI) works because it spotlights pollution.
 As one chemical industry representative noted, "There's not a chief exec-
 utive officer around who wants to be the biggest polluter in the state."
 Seeking to intensify this focus, and thus the incentive to reduce pollution,
 a major U.S. environmental group, the Environmental Defense Fund
 (EDF), recently launched a free, online "Chemical Scorecard"
 (www.scorecard.org) that makes TRi data accessible to anyone with an
 Internet connection and a computer. Although other groups have previ-
 ously posted TRI data on the Web, the EDF has taken the next step: incor-
 porating information on the relative toxicity of compounds and providing
 rankings-by county and state, zip code, and facility-that focus on the
 biggest health threats. In addition, the scorecard provides user-friendly
 maps that display schools, major roads, and Tm facilities, as well as take-
 action tools that allow users to send faxes free of charge to high-ranking
 polluting facilities. It is too soon to know how much the Web site will
 affect corporate behavior, but the project is off to a strong start: The site
 received over 4 million hits in its first two weeks of operation.
 -A.F.
 SUMMER 1998 59
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Thu, 19 Oct 2017 02:12:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The End of Secrecy
 spurred imitation: In 1997, the Philippines announced the introduction
 of a public information program called EcoWatch.
 In none of these cases are the reporting requirements accompanied
 by laws putting limits on emissions. But educated communities have
 given companies a strong incentive to clean up their act, without gov-
 ernment enforcement.
 THE PROBLEMS WITH TRANSPARENCY
 So far, so good. Transparency appears to be winning its slugfest with the
 forces of opacity-and to good effect for the world. As the move toward
 global integration prompts increasingly shared standards of correct behav-
 ior, we see ever more frequent calls for transparency to ensure that those
 standards are being met. But there are significant reasons to move cau-
 tiously toward greater reliance on openness, and they are more com-
 pelling than the simple inertia that characterizes most defenses of opacity:
 " In the absence of universally shared, or at least mutually compati-
 ble, norms, transparency will aggravate conflict. It may simply
 remove the ambiguity that can otherwise conceal conflicts or soften
 disagreements. For example, the world is arguably better off politely
 ignoring Israel's well-known but undeclared nuclear capability than
 demanding that Israel own up to it. Although the principle of nuclear
 nonproliferation is well established among most other countries, few
 expect that Israel can be made to accept it. The costs to the nonpro-
 liferation regime of forcing the issue are higher than the benefits.
 " Some secrets are legitimately worth protecting. Corporations
 imperil their business strategy if their competitors are able to distill
 key elements from public documents. And countries have national
 security reasons for hiding certain information. In the early days of
 the Cold War, the Soviet rejection of U.S. transparency initiatives,
 such as Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal to permit the superpowers
 to overfly one another's territory, made perfect sense. The USSR
 feared the United States would use the information it gathered not
 to reassure itself about Soviet activities, but to pinpoint targets.
 " Information can easily be misused or misinterpreted. Transparency
 reveals behavior, but not intent. At the international level, what
 someone is doing is less important than why they are doing it. Amer-
 icans do not worry about the British building nuclear weapons
 because Americans believe that Britain harbors no hostile intent, but
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 they remain anxious about the possibility of a nuclear Iran. The
 potential for misuse of information is equally troubling. Many of the
 emerging systems of regulation by revelation depend heavily on
 NGOs to collect and disseminate information. Supposedly, these are
 unbiased and competent organizations working solely for the public
 interest. In reality, they are unelected, unaccountable, and some-
 times less transparent than the institutions they monitor.
 m Even if all the conditions are right, transparency does not always
 work. Knowing that someone is watching you does not necessarily
 make you change your behavior. Even with the publicity given to the
 TRI, emissions of noxious chemicals in the United States have yet to
 drop to zero. Saddam Hussein is unlikely to stay awake nights worry-
 ing about what the public or civil society thinks. Because regulation
 by revelation only works if revelation sparks action, it requires a mobi-
 lized, or at least mobilizable, public. Transparency merely raises the
 costs of delinquency; it does not render such behavior impossible.
 For all these reasons-plus the natural human tendency to shy away
 from public scrutiny-an irreversible global move toward regulation by
 revelation remains far from assured. Resistance is strong, even in quar-
 ters that have already moved closer to the transparency end of the con-
 tinuum. The U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA), for
 example, claims to support the TRI but when the EPA moved to nearly
 double the number of chemicals included, the CMA sued to stop it (and
 lost). As holders of the EU's rotating presidency, the British are pushing
 fellow member states for more transparency in the group's decision mak-
 ing. In response, the Council of Ministers held a debate on openness in
 March 1998-behind closed doors. And the appetite of the newly
 transparent British for openness is fitful at best: Although British offi-
 cials in Brussels supported a request from a U.K. television company to
 film a discussion among heads of EU member states on a proposed direc-
 tive on air quality, officials from the British departments of transport,
 environment, and trade and industry objected.
 Despite the potential drawbacks, however, the world will see trans-
 parency used more and more as a means of changing the behavior of
 states and corporations. The reason is purely pragmatic. Governments
 face growing and potentially overwhelming demands on their time and
 resources. States must provide physical infrastructure, inclusive or uni-
 versal education, legal systems that stand up to international scrutiny,
 military security, and police. They must maintain compliance with a
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 wide range of international human rights standards. They are expected
 to participate in a bewildering range of environmental treaties, preserve
 the environment within their borders, and set macroeconomic policies
 that will ensure sustainable economic development. They are supposed
 to provide social safety nets for a growing number of senior citizens in
 rich countries and for a huge boom of young and unemployed people in
 developing ones. And many face a decreasing willingness on the part of
 their publics to pay the taxes necessary to fund all these programs.
 As information technology and free trade bring the world closer togeth-
 er, many of these governmental functions will cross existing national
 boundaries. The problems already do. Because it is so hard for governments
 to enforce compliance across national borders, it makes sense for them to
 take on a different role: that of an enforcer, not of specific rules, but of
 diligent transparency. For example, governments, rather than setting
 reserve requirements for banks, might insist that each bank inform the
 public of its reserve levels. States might move away from cumbersome
 policies mandating specific, environmentally friendly production tech-
 niques, or even precise emissions limits, and instead establish systems
 for reporting what individual facilities and companies emit. In arms
 control, where negotiations are shifting away from large state-controlled
 systems of nuclear and conventional weapons to such matters as the
 trade in light arms, governments might insist on maintaining registries
 of arms production and transfer rather than enforcing bans.
 Only governments can regulate in the coercive way we usually think
 about regulation, but many entities can reveal. With states, internation-
 al organizations, and corporations all prodding one another to release
 ever more information, civil society can take that information, analyze
 and compile it, and disseminate it to networks of citizen groups and con-
 sumer organizations. Transparency encourages a new kind of "devolu-
 tion"-not from central to local government, but from government to
 civil society. Even relatively open governments are less than happy about
 this development, as the new glare of scrutiny shines on them along with
 everyone else, but their options are limited.
 Winston Churchill famously said of democracy that it "is the worst
 form of government except all those other forms that have been tried
 from time to time." The new approach to cross-border governance,
 based on revelation rather than governmental coercion, may prove sim-
 ilar: a problematic, inefficient system that many would consider a poor
 option-if the alternatives were not even worse.
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 Transparency provides the basis for a highly democratic, albeit non-
 electoral, system of transnational governance based on the growing
 strength of global civil society. It made sense to cling to secrecy in a
 world truly divided into discrete nation-states. But in this era of global
 integration, transparency is the only appropriate standard.
 WANT TO KNOW MORE?
 Despite all the hoopla over "transparency and accountability," few writ-
 ers have done much in the way of rigorous analysis. A notable excep-
 tion is the work that took place under the auspices of the Brookings
 Institution's project on cooperative security, directed by John Stein-
 bruner. In the volume that resulted from the project, Global Engage-
 ment: Cooperation and Security in the 21st Century, edited by Janne
 Nolan (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1994), the chapters
 by Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes and by Wolfgang
 Reinicke merit special attention. These authors have since published
 books that deal with what the Chayeses term transparency and
 Reinicke calls regulation by disclosure: The New Sovereignty: Compli-
 ance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge: Harvard
 University Press, 1995), by Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler
 Chayes; and Global Public Policy: Governing Without Government?
 (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 1998), by Wolfgang
 Reinicke. The most fun reading on the subject is undoubtedly the work
 of David Brin, physicist and award-winning science fiction author. His
 first nonfiction book, The Transparent Society (Reading: Addison-
 Wesley, 1998) addresses themes from technology to privacy rights to the
 politics of encryption in an engaging and accessible style, and his
 remarkable 1990 novel, Earth (New York: Bantam Spectra, 1990)
 remains well worth reading a decade later.
 For links to relevant Web sites, as well as a comprehensive index of
 related articles, access www.foreignpolicy.com.
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